Scenarios to explore the futures of the emerging technology of organic and large area electronics

For a long time, the domain of OLAE was (and still is to a large extent) a world in which technology-linked relationships among actors dominate. Business-to-business relationships are explored, and “new combinations” are formed across traditional value chains. The increased use of the acronym OLAE to indicate the domain, and its promise, is linked to the broadening of the domain in the early years of the twenty-first century.

The domain started with the discovery of organic semiconducting materials by Shirakawa, MacDiarmid, and Heeger [6], which led to visions about the use of conjugated organic molecules and organic/inorganic composites to function as semiconductors, to emit light, and to exploit the mechanical properties (flexibility) of these materials. This would then create a shift from the present silicon plus lithography-based manufacturing in the electronics industry to potentially cleaner, more flexible, and cost-effective manufacturing processes like printing [7]. The initial focus for organic electronics was the electroluminescent functionality of OLED materials (based on discoveries in the Kodak and Cavendish laboratories). As Sauer et al. showed [8], a lock-in emerged where displays were the main application. However, during the early 2000s, it became clear that the technology was not ready for market introduction and further research and development (R&D) activities were necessary. At the same time and, in particular in Europe, the vision of cheaper, cleaner, and more flexible manufacturing opened up the dominant focus on display applications and mobilized wider support for the domain. Eventually, in the Sixth Framework Program of the European Union (EU), running from 2002 to 2006, appreciable resources were allocated to the broader domain.

A particular concern was about the underlying assumption that the progress along learning curves would be rapid enough to overtake existing technologies. At least, the assumption remained unchecked in the open-ended promises about potentially disruptive technologies like printed RFID, cheap and disposable point-of-care devices, organic photovoltaics, and OLED for displays and lighting. Gamota et al. [10] added that the promise of low-cost applications was based on the assumption that products would be taken up widely and that low cost would be achieved through economies of scale.

This justified the use of an umbrella term like OLAE. The umbrella term was important to create synergy and connect the different developments at the basic component level, while putting forward a widely shared promise about possibilities of use in a variety of application fields—and thus creating momentum for resource mobilization. The actual level of commitment the various actors were making depended on their assessment of the maturity of technology and its potential profitability. Thus, an important factor in the development of the domain relates to the business models of different actors.

An example is how the printing industry feels uncertainty about value capture and profitability. The inkjet printing industry was profitable because of the sales generated by supplying ink rather than by selling printers. The inkjet business in OLAE is different, and it is not clear how profits can be realized in the new situation. Interestingly, there may be shifts in the value chain, partly enabled by expiring of existing patents on OLED materials. Inkjet companies may then leverage economic advantage by formulating own materials or partnering with firms that have the capability to do so [12]. Such shifts can lead to the emergence of new entities in the value chain, like design houses for products with different specifications.

Other examples of pressures on existing business models are in the materials industry. Upstream actors play a key role as materials are crucial for device performance. There is a lot of trial and error in materials development and use, which is exacerbated by the uncertainties about OLAE applications. Exploring the performance requirements of materials for specific inkjet techniques requires material suppliers to form new alignments with ink manufacturers and printer manufacturers [12]. A subsequent challenge is that the amount of materials used in the printing technologies is much less than in the traditional deposition technologies. In other words, if the promises of OLAE are realized, this will disrupt present business models: Traditional chemical suppliers are used to sell large volumes of materials, but in the new situation, they must adapt their pricing strategies. They must learn to produce for niche applications of organic electronics.

The overall picture is one where actors monitor developments of options in the domain of OLAE, as well as actual and possible strategies of other actors. The uncertainty about options and moves at the side of materials supply creates challenges for more downstream technology developers and product integrators, almost forcing them to take a wait-and-see position. The uncertainty about technological developments particularly increases the risk for actors to commit resources, so that they wait for the necessary parts of the system to be developed—somehow.

One such challenge is the need to develop encapsulation techniques and materials. Encapsulation is a critical problem in realizing organic electronics products because organic materials are highly sensitive and fragile and deteriorate when exposed to oxygen and moisture in the air [13]. While shortcomings in encapsulation are recognized as constituting a reverse salient for the further expansion of OLAE, work on them is limited because return on investment is uncertain—it depends on whether the expansion of OLAE will materialize.⁷

As the OLAE landscape was becoming more crowded, anticipatory coordination in the field became important and was pursued. An important actor is the Organic Electronics Association (OEA), established in 2005 as an information and communication platform by companies and institutes active in this domain. One of the main activities pursued by OEA besides promoting the potential of the field in policy and commercial domains has been in facilitating the development of application roadmaps as a way to articulate expectations. But this was not enough. In a presentation titled “The status and future of organic and flexible electronics”, in December 2007, Michael Heckmeier (Director at Merck Chemicals Ltd. UK) explained that the reason why the market of organic electronics is not “exploding” has to do with the combination of considerable uncertainty on the technology side and at the same time lack of interested end users.⁸

He further argued: “We want to avoid speculatively developing equipment or printed electronics products until the technology and the market are more mature.” ⁹

It is clear, also to quite a number of actors, that some concerted action is necessary, within value chains and across them, to overcome the waiting game and realize at least something of the promise of OLAE. The other route is visible in the conclusion of a competence matrix study by the University of Reading on plastic electronics in the UK: “There is no incentive for companies to develop compatible standards or push for common technology platforms without a powerful end-user to insist on this” [14]. This implies another way to overcome the waiting game: action by a powerful end user, for example, a national government introducing a procurement program for a set of products requiring OLAE technology. (We have actually taken this option as the starting point for our second scenario.)

The diagnosis is clear: uncertainty about technological developments in the field of OLAE increases the risks for actors to commit resources, and this translates into a situation where actors will have to wait for the other parts of the system to be developed. Lack of articulated demand, and the differences across sectors, exacerbates the situation, in the sense that concrete directions of product development are not clear and actors have to refer to promises in making choices. Key actors like material suppliers and printing equipment manufacturers anticipate changes to their current business models, but are reluctant to move. Actors face tensions, up to dilemmas, and anticipatory coordination problems.

The next step in our diagnosis is to use insights from technology and innovation studies to identify key dilemmas—this is a way to highlight what the stakes are, even if they are not always as clearly visible as we formulate them here. Such dilemmas, often applicable to emerging technologies more generally, are building blocks in constructing scenarios because they show tensions as well as potential forks in the story line, depending on which horn of the dilemma is followed. They are also helpful in highlighting the nature of the situation to the participants in the strategy articulation workshops.¹⁰

A first and important question (although rarely checked concretely) is whether the new technology will progress at a sufficiently rapid pace along its learning curve to overtake existing technologies, also because existing technologies will improve and present value chains and markets may not welcome the new technology. The response could be: hope for the best because the promise will mobilize resources. But one might also be more careful about relying on promises and focus on realizing immediate performance improvements and production capacity ramp-up—while reducing one’s ambitions.

A second question is about market entry strategies. The disruptive nature of applications of OLAE creates a choice whether to go slowly or try to build on the promise. In other words, early market introduction in niche applications only, while embedding in society is tested out, or early market introduction without checking societal robustness. In the field of organic solar cells, the second strategy is very visible, while for point-of-care sensors in health care, the first strategy is (or should be) followed to meet the requirements of the health care domain.

A third question is about relying on government support, which implies that public goals have to be taken into account (like wealth creation and sustainability). One strategy to reduce uncertainty is to go for strong and dedicated government support and accept that it comes with a need to refer to the public interest—which then opens the door for comment and criticism in terms of public interest. (This possibility will actually be explored in scenario 1.) The other strategy is to accept all the risks of realizing technical and market requirements and profit from government support (e.g., to stimulate market adoption of societally important products through subsidies) when it happens to coincide with own activities.

In these three questions, we identified with technology and business actors and discussed their strategic choices. A fourth question starts with government actors having to make strategic choices; innovation policy studies have addressed such issues. In the case of emerging technologies like OLAE, governments are justified to stimulate the development of such technologies because firms in the marketplace will invest suboptimally: the so-called market deficit. But governments do not necessarily have the competence to make the right technology choices: the so-called government deficit, actually a competence deficit at their side. Thus, governments have to balance between the amount of risk they are prepared to take and the criticism that they might be subjected to if this risk-taking leads to failures and, in any case, to opportunity costs. The dilemma is to go for dedicated support, facing the risk that there will be little value for the public money expended, or to play a modest role, just creating favorable conditions like fiscal regimes and adequate intellectual property regulation, accepting there will be suboptimal developments.

Each of the three scenarios shown in this section builds on what might happen when a specific way to address the waiting game and tensions and dilemmas more generally materializes. Only for the first scenario is the text, with annotations, given in full so that the reader of this article can appreciate how participants could recognize themselves and others in the description of the present situation and immediate future, and then be taken out of their common-sense ideas by being confronted with unexpected but plausible futures. This created a context for participants of our workshops to think anticipatorily and interact in terms of each other’s realities and possible strategic actions.

The genre of writing is quasi-factual: the future is told as if this is what happens. This may be disconcerting sometimes for a reader in 2012, as when the opening line of the first scenario says: “In Dresden, late 2009, one OLAE firm got into trouble and another one moved to South Korea.” We have not updated the text because it is an exhibit. At the time, for the participants in the workshops, it was formally part of the future, but a real possibility (cf. the annotation). Thus, there is some blurring between the formally fictional future and the factual (in the sense of “has happened”) elements of the present situation that are used in the scenarios to create a sense of continuity with the future. In the introduction, we argued for this in terms of our approach of endogenous futures. Here, we add a communicative function: enrolling participants of the workshops into the scenarios as a world they know that gradually turns into a future that they have to take into account in the here and now.

To introduce the scenarios, we offer brief outlines showing the key interventions (fictional but plausible) that set further developments in motion. The first scenario starts with a concerted effort, enabled and financially supported by the EC, to develop applications, particularly for lighting, to mobilize users and to include further stakeholders like environmental groups. There was some debate about the relevance of pursuing this direction, and this returned when the actual performance turned out to be disappointing. Some big actors withdrew from the joint initiative, and this was a signal to shift directions (to applications in photovoltaics). In retrospect, important learning had occurred, even if the joint initiative had not been able to realize its original goal.

The second scenario starts with the decision of the UK government (later joined by other governments) to use procurement to materialize the promises of OLAE. The actual procurement was linked to the challenges of security and focused on e-passports with OLAE-enabled RFID and display. This initiative was an argument for Germany to also stimulate OLAE, but then for organic photovoltaics, and not through procurement but by supporting pre-competitive development focusing on generic problems like encapsulation techniques. Spillovers of these two developments occurred, but the procurement program collapsed because security, now of the passport holders, could not be guaranteed. One effect was that use of RFID shifted to “safe” applications like retail and entertainment. Organic photovoltaics could not deliver on all its promises, but there were important applications because of new collaborations in sectors like the building sector.

The third scenario starts with actors in the product value chains willing to get together. A strategy discussion meeting organized by big materials companies triggered a variety of alliances between companies across product value chains and joint technology development. Progress was made at the manufacturing side, although market introduction at first suffered from product quality problems. Price reductions reduced adoption barriers and created new possibilities, for example, for cheap sensors for medical and environmental applications—provided that the quality requirements could be met.

In Dresden, late 2009, one OLAE firm got into trouble and another one moved to South Korea. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote this up and called for action.¹¹ The ensuing debate was taken up in other European countries and broadened to discussion about the competitive position of Europe in high-tech areas. The European Commissioner for Trade, who had wanted anyway to take an initiative towards wealth creation as a response to the economic crisis, but also shaped by the wish to revive manufacturing, as well as to build on earlier investments of the EC, saw the debate as an opportunity to do something, starting with the establishment of a High-Level Expert Group (consisting of academic, policy, and industrial actors).¹²

The report argued that Europe has a frontrunner position in the field of OLAE compared to other regions (USA and Asia) that was created through the R&D investments in this field.¹³ It was highlighted that Asian companies were leveraging existing standard manufacturing (linear evaporating line); this was indicated by the announcement of a Japanese venture (Lumiotec) to start a pilot manufacturing site to develop OLED lighting which are flat and thin but rigid.¹⁴ The conclusion was that moving towards a stronger involvement in large area production potentially with organic electronics is an opportunity for Europe.¹⁵ But also a strong diagnosis: lack of user involvement and working on unproven manufacturing technologies would make investments from industry difficult in the OLAE field.¹⁶ Without continuity in dedicated funding to stimulate developments in manufacturing, investments made under the sixth and seventh framework projects might not lead to wealth creation in Europe. If not remedied, that would cause the European position in the mid-term to be weakened and eventually to lose its frontrunner position to the USA and Asia.¹⁷ Organic photovoltaics and flexible OLED lighting were identified as promising options for the EC initiative.¹⁸

The Expert Group created focused working groups to assess emerging technologies with added value for the European economies. OLAE was one such field, seen as enabling new approaches towards ambient intelligence with novel approaches to make efficient lighting, displays, and low-cost electronics.¹⁹ Branch associations had already taken initiatives to make the promise of this area visible by specifying a broad range of possible applications and components that made use of various materials like organic, inorganic, or hybrid materials and fabricated via large-area mass manufacturing processes.²⁰ Such open-ended promises about next generation information technologies, energy, health care, and entertainment solutions, and social benefits could now be linked to the general aims of the EU initiatives. The team of experts in this working group produced a first white paper, presenting a strategic assessment of opportunities and threats for Europe.²¹

The report did not create a big stir, but reinforced the positive atmosphere around OLAE, in which possibilities were explored, European regions put the technology on their agenda, and an occasional imaginative venture capitalist supported a small and medium enterprises (SME) branching out into this area.²² The focus on lighting as an important area of application was supported by the new EU regulation to phase out traditional light bulbs.²³

The advice of the High-Level Expert Group, including a priority for OLAE, for lighting was included when the EC announced a Joint Technology Initiative (JTI) on “the factories of the future” later in 2010. Manufacturing was the key challenge, and the first step was a consultation process. European Technology Platforms (e.g., Photonics21, European Nanoelectronics Initiative, Clean Environment Technologies, etc.) were included in identifying promising areas of high value which deserved strengthening beyond the framework programs.²⁴ Incumbent industrial players in lighting said that flexible lighting foils were a promising route. They argued that organic photovoltaics lagged behind in development, particularly with respect to encapsulation. Leveraging advantages of (roll-to-roll) manufacturing would eventually enable cheap OLED lighting applications to compete in the general lighting application market and thus lead to wealth creation.²⁵ Issues were identified by various parties. The spokesperson of a coordinated EU Framework project emphasized the promise: “We demonstrated high quality lamination foil for flexible lighting and the opportunity that these technology platforms can be used in other low-cost electronic devices as well. Leveraging on these findings is of key strategic importance for future product development trajectories in Europe.”²⁶ The CTO of a large material developer focusing on OLED lighting materials said: “The OLED market will have two parts, displays and lighting. Asian companies dominate the display industry and there is little hope for Europe to get this back. For OLED lighting it is different, because lighting production still exists in Europe with large players like Philips and Osram. This is an emerging market with lots of opportunities especially because of the tendency of large lighting companies to direct their investments and resources into OLEDs for lighting.”²⁷ There were also sounds of caution as in the speech of the chair of the Energy and Sustainability Committee of the European Association for Lighting Designers: “Inflated claims about performances of LEDs in the past created skepticism in the designers’ community making them cautious in recommending LED luminaries. OLED manufacturers should avoid hype about product performances and bring well tested products to the market.”²⁸

The net effect was that the promises for lighting applications were accepted by the EC and support was forthcoming for an alliance with big incumbents which would focus on roll-to-roll manufacturing of lighting foils.²⁹ Earlier experience with promises which were not realized prompted the EC add a monitoring scheme, with a requirement for at least some short-term results. Now, there was further justification, emphasized in the presentation of the draft proposal in Brussels, that the difficult economic conditions in Europe required investments in R&D to make significant societal and economic contributions within a few years.³⁰ Not everyone was happy with this requirement. As a spokesperson for an R&D company said: “these requirements bureaucratize the process, which make the whole funding procedure inefficient.” Eventually, participants were willing to accept this requirement as a temporary instrument. The funding support from EC and credibility of efforts that came with it allowed uncertainties of developing new unproven manufacturing capabilities for lighting to be reduced and standardization of manufacturing lines be improved. These advantages were widely recognized.³¹

The representative of Professional Lightings Design Association (PLDA) was quoted in a news article explaining that their engagement would open up the opportunity to make an actual difference in the new developments within the lighting industry, instead of coming in at a late stage: “Our engagement opens up the opportunity to identify and engage users in early stage. We will also collaborate in measurement activities to provide reassurance to the designer’s community about different performance promises. This will prevent past mistakes made with LED luminaries.”

When the JTI was eventually launched, early in 2011, an interesting further move became visible. A spokesperson of a lighting company proposed (but after careful preparation and consultation) to include design associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the initiative, as a strategy to show that it was more than following promises: “Our activities shouldn’t only focus on solving technical issues, we also need to consider requirements of end-users.” He had been able to convince the PLDA and Friends of the Earth, an NGO focused on technology and environmental issues, to engage in the JTI. Good feelings were voiced, and concerted work started immediately.³²

The OLAE landscape in Europe now became dominated by the challenge of OLED-based lighting applications.³³ There are three strands in the story: the JTI and its fate, responses to the European initiative, and other OLAE activities going on as well.

The strong support in Europe for a collaborative approach focusing on flexible OLED lighting applications implied a competitive challenge to which the Japanese company Lumiotec had to respond. Kido, the scientific director, recognized the advantages that roll-to-roll manufacturing might have in lighting applications, but announced a pragmatic strategy at the annual international technology expo in Japan, “We have been able to solve issues with production and performance in the past two years in our pilot setting and our partners are convinced we can have the first mover advantage, so we are planning to scale up production in 2012.” They would increase their efforts to enter the lighting market.³⁴

Other application areas of OLAE were pursued mainly by SME’s and start-ups from research institutes or multinational electronic companies. Especially in Germany, support from Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) made further work possible on printed RFIDs and organic printed photovoltaics.³⁵ Printed RFIDs and organic printed photovoltaics were being tested in pilot settings, and e-readers were further developed and first flexible e-readers of Plastic Logic were explored in niches.³⁶

By 2012, while developments in flexible lighting continued at a pace, the hopes of Plastic Logic were confronted with disappointing uptake of their e-reader. Traditional publishers were not adapting, and debates on intellectual property rights spilled over in this domain. The need to have severe restriction on piracy had caused different platforms to emerge that were not compatible. The e-reader industry was struggling.³⁷

A lateral effect was that E-Ink, the main technology supplier, devised strategies to stimulate expansion of use of its technology to other application areas. A breakthrough in the developments of thin film batteries had made it possible to integrate the displays in magazine covers. In a technology expo organized in Dresden, Germany, E-Ink’s CEO announced contracts with various magazine publishers. Its CEO said “Our unique technology will change the future of publishing and opens a new chapter to advertising.” Esquire magazine had been the first to try the technology a few years earlier and was explicitly mentioned to be the first contractor.³⁸

The intended announcement effect, to mobilize for wide deployment of E-Ink displays in magazines, had an unintended effect when it incited negative reactions from environmental groups which argued that the new applications E-Ink aimed for meant an increase of environmental burden. Greenpeace started an electronic campaign under the slogan “Esquire magazine, the Darth Vader of electronic reading,” saying that the publishing industry should put their thinking cap on. There were mixed reactions in the sustainability community. As a result, magazines across Europe felt they had to publicly announce they would refrain from using the electronic magazine cover option.³⁹

Two years after the start of the JTI, the first reporting round in 2013 showed efforts at technology development, but also reflected a concern, emphasized by PLDA representatives. According to industrial standard tests, the performance of lighting products produced in the pilot line appeared to be lower than required for general lighting applications. It appeared that much more R&D by material developers was needed on solution processable polymer OLED materials to optimize the performances required for general lighting applications.⁴⁰ In addition, the costs now incurred in material development and production would lead to prices unfavorable to the competitive position of OLEDs against other lighting applications in the market. The strategic review recognized that products for lighting design applications and signage applications for advertising would still be feasible before the project ended.⁴¹

Thus, in contrast to the original high hopes, the products developed might well remain limited to niche applications where the flexibility of the application was seen as a key advantage and lower performances were acceptable. There were already examples. Through PLDA, contacts were made with the design team of the German automobile manufacturer Daimler and airplane manufacturer Airbus. Daimler had announced to use flexible lighting in the dashboards of its new S-class Mercedes. Concurrently also, Airbus announced that the flexibility of lights was seen as a key advantage to be used in airplane lighting designs and ordered the lights for the A380. Other design applications for indoor lighting were also being pursued by specialty lighting design companies.⁴²

Independently, Friends of the Earth reacted skeptically to the course of developments with the sudden shift towards design lighting applications. Ruth Walther from Friends of the Earth Germany queried how the overall energy efficiency promise of the JTI could be realized if it only remained a design lighting application to be used besides other applications or as advertising signage application which would only encourage more energy usage. She was quoted criticizing the earlier choices made by EC to invest in lighting applications: “the promise of wealth creation that was embraced for lighting applications had blinded people to see other developments that were occurring and which might score better on sustainability.” The reference was, in particular, to ongoing activities in Germany (supported by BMBF) focusing on organic photovoltaics. In response, it was pointed out by scientists in the JTI that uptake of organic photovoltaics had been problematic as well because of technical difficulties with encapsulation and strong competition with other available technologies.⁴³

The signals given by Friends of the Earth were used by green-oriented parties in European Parliament in the debate in Parliament about the sustainability policy of European governments and companies (together with electronic displays in magazines as an example of carelessness in dealing with environmental aspects). The critical question was raised whether EC investments in the JTI on lighting will ever realize the promise of reduction of energy consumption. As a Green Party MP summarized it: “European citizens expect governments and companies to deploy sustainable strategies in product development.”⁴⁴

By 2014, actors from the lighting industry and more broadly had realized that the rhetorics of breakthrough were not sufficient to create a learning curve that would overtake competing of existing technologies in the lighting market (fluorescent, halogen, and LED), especially when these were improving as well. The high hopes for reducing costs through new manufacturing processes had entailed some neglect of other aspects like efficiency and longevity.⁴⁵ Further competitive pressure was visible in the construction sector because of pressure from the European Energy Performance of Buildings directive that aimed at achieving strong energy use reductions by 2019. Lumiotec was leveraging on the use of high-performance materials that were processed in standard evaporation lines and the demand for flat OLED panels was rising.⁴⁶

In this situation, a major move occurred when a big incumbent, Philips, recognizing the dynamics of supply and demand, announced that it would start producing OLED lighting panels in license from Lumiotec.⁴⁷ This undermined the credibility of the ongoing JTI, and the OLAE landscape in Europe started to shift.

In the 2015 participants’ meeting in Brussels, the JTI coordinator evaluated the situation: “We have been able to make large steps forward in this project, but to compete in the market for general lighting challenges have to be solved on the materials side. This will take longer than we expected. It is still possible to use the manufacturing technology platform developed in the JTI for production of organic photovoltaics. But the requirements for encapsulation are tough and have to be addressed”.⁴⁸

The EC immediately embraced the proposal to shift the focus to organic photovoltaics to show their intent to provide solutions to some of society’s biggest problems, such as climate change. The JTI followed, with some grumbling of participants, and a new promise was put upfront: Cleaner and renewable energy thanks to photovoltaics. The weaknesses were recognized as well, and new collaborations were forged with materials suppliers that specialized in encapsulation applications of photovoltaics. A preliminary analysis of the public consultation on the future of JTI showed widespread support among stakeholders for the new move.

When the original coordinator of JTI was interviewed for the Christmas 2015 issue of The Economist, and the interviewer asked whether “with the benefit of hindsight it might have been better to focus on organic photovoltaics from the beginning rather than lighting,” he got a nuanced answer. “The drive for wealth creation at the time may have biased us, but important learning occurred, in particular that a major hurdle existed in the problems with encapsulation. You need a concerted effort to learn such things that were not clearly seen in the beginning. Even if the original goal wasn’t achieved, the investment may have been worth it.”

For reasons of space, only excerpts of the full text are given. The deleted parts are indicated by square brackets, and sometimes a summary is provided to keep the storyline visible.

At the level of national governments all over Europe, there was a tendency to abstain from stimulating specific technologies—sadder and wiser because of earlier such projects that were not so successful—and to rely more on procurement to stimulate innovation.⁴⁹ Traditionally, Departments of Defense had worked with procurement contracts. This was now extended, again with reference to the public interest, to goals like internal and external security and clean energy production.⁵⁰ The implication was a reluctance to buy into broad promises as those of OLAE, and into open-ended support of new technological developments in general. Germany still had a tradition of government willing to push technologies for the public good, like green technologies.⁵¹ In the UK, there was already a tradition of procurement, and now also a strong interest in security.⁵² Thus, the Minister of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) initiated a debate about areas of focus for his country’s future.⁵³ The debate included leading scientists who were active in the scientific and industrial development of OLAE in UK, who were predictably optimistic. Some key industrial actors were also enthusiastic […], but they tended to refer to Germany where companies from all over Europe were attracted […] to establish manufacturing.

[During the debate, the difficulties to obtain private funding to make the transition from the research laboratory to the marketplace were emphasized. In addition, there were the further uncertainties about return on investment from unproven technologies with markets that still had to be created. To encourage marketable products and services, the Council for Science and Technology pointed to the significance of the government using procurement.]

After intensive debates with other government departments, in particular Defense, the Minister of BIS announced a plan to initiate innovative procurement mechanisms to stimulate product development and manufacturing in areas beneficial for the public interest. The actual focus of the procurement program that would start in 2011 was on security applications in e-passports.⁵⁴ [The choice for this particular strand of development had to do with the availability of a platform of relevant technological options.]

[There were also critical voices. Different advocacy groups had opposed the use of RFID technology in e-passports, arguing that the failure of the technology would have drastic and irreversible consequences since privacy and identity of the holders would not be protected. The authorities, however, could justify their choice by referring to the larger good of preventing terrorism. In fact, other European countries also joined into the procurement program, which meant an expansion of development activities and firms across Europe became involved.]⁵⁵

A further effect was increased visibility for OLAE, and other application areas were identified. A company that provided a global analysis of the printed electronics area realized that, if developments of e-labels would mature, this would allow more sophisticated applications in the packaging industry.⁵⁶ The example of UK buying into promises of OLAE offered an opportunity for German promise champions to push broad promises for green technologies. Politicians in Germany were interested in the move towards procurement in the UK for their own reasons. So, a meeting could be organized in 2012 in Dresden.⁵⁷ [During the meeting, it was emphasized that organic photovoltaics had to be used in products as quickly as possible, even if performances were not ideal; but critics voiced concerns about the actual life expectancy, efficiency, and standardization.]

After intensive debates, the German authorities decided that the procurement route for the applications of organic photovoltaics had too many uncertainties. Instead, they identified technical reverse salients to further development, in particular encapsulation, necessary to improve life expectancy and stability issues for different application areas including lighting, displays, and photovoltaics. Actually, German industry (including lighting, automotive, photovoltaics, etc.) was already heavily involved in such developments. The necessary competencies were in place for a different government strategy: support for the development of a technology platform to address the reverse salient.⁵⁸ Secondly, by the time that applications of organic photovoltaics had matured, the government committed itself to subsidize its use, to enhance its appeal to customers.⁵⁹ The thinking behind this was clear in an interview with a high-ranking government official: “the technology platform would tie the broad promises of OLAE to specific markets to enable learning curves to advance.”

The technology platform set other things in motion. By 2013, printing companies were willing to increase their investment in realizing roll-to-roll processes because they expected solutions to encapsulation issues which would reduce the uncertainty whether product manufacturing through roll-to-roll processes could be realized.⁶⁰

[The expansion of activities in RFIDs and e-label systems were creating spillovers to other sectors. Retailers, packaging and printing companies, and incumbent pharmaceutical companies could launch products where RFID systems were directly printed on packages.] While expansion of activities in e-labels and RFID continued everywhere, the procurement program for e-passports ran into problems, exactly because of the reference to security as a public interest. [In 2014, a report was issued by the European Electronic Privacy Information Center revealing that the RFID-powered flexible display technology distracted inspectors from their duties instead of improving the effectiveness of control, actually causing more opportunity for terrorists. The increasing criticism created a dilemma in the consortium and eventually the traditional approach of checking and monitoring was restored.]

Thus, the OLAE landscape in Europe changed, and in two ways. First, photovoltaics became the dominant direction. Germany’s sustained investments in organic photovoltaics had paid off in their being in the lead, and there was no specific criticism to be faced. Technology platforms which allowed niche developments for low-performance photovoltaics, supported by German government, had made considerable progress in terms of material development and standardization of cheap roll-to-roll manufacturing.⁶¹ Second, user interests from different sectors became attracted to the OLAE domain. [There was interest from other sectors (e.g., the automotive sector) to take up organic photovoltaics in their products. The technology platform also enabled exploration of niche applications in other sectors (e.g., lighting) where encapsulation was key to market introduction. But ambivalences returned when public controversy around privacy related issues in relation to the use of integrated RFID technology in e-labels emerged.]

The immediate effect was that major brand owners stopped item-level tagging and only used RFID technologies for retail purposes [xlii]. Firms shifted their focus to other applications in the trading card market where smart cards (that could be inserted into electronic reader attached to a PC) were used for entertainment purposes like online gaming.⁶²

By 2015/2016, the OLAE landscape was very different from what it was projected to be in 2009/2010. A retired official of the UK Department BIS, who had played a key role in linking procurement philosophy and promising technologies at the time, was interviewed for a German TV production on the societal value of new technologies. Looking back, he said he would go for e-passports again, but now because this would force promise champions to become concrete, and thus, start learning processes which would actually deliver something. If not e-passports, then technology platforms that could be used for product development for other applications. The interviewer was not convinced, but had to agree that the German photovoltaics program which focused on technology platforms had delivered, even if its success depended on the active interests from the building sector.

For reasons of space, only excerpts of the full text are given. The deleted parts are summarized (in italics) to keep the story line visible.

At a meeting of the American Institute for Research Management in 2009, Peter Hershel from Corporate Strategy of DuPont, a chemical/materials company, got into conversation with Paolo Gargini, Director of Technology Strategy at Intel, a major and innovative microelectronics company. Gargini explained how Intel had engaged with various suppliers of new generation lithography back in the 1990s because, at that time, they anticipated that they would depend on the strategies of suppliers. The new electronics, and especially OLAE, depended on materials, which had to be supplied. There was no equivalent to Intel in the OLAE domain, but Hershel realized that DuPont could be proactive: to capture value, they had to engage with technology partners further down the value chain.⁶³

In general, chemical companies anticipate shifts in the value chain and are willing to take a long-term view even now when they feel the effects of the financial crisis. They realize that the lack of standards and unproven manufacturing technologies makes it difficult for various producers to commit to the adoption of the initial proof of concepts that were available.⁶⁴ The two concerns together led DuPont to organize a top level strategy meeting in Greece in 2010, to identify ways of moving forward. A variety of relevant parties were invited, and they came, which testified to the importance they accorded to OLAE and to the need to interact. The positions taken were diverse.⁶⁵ [Several strategies were emphasized during the meeting, ranging from the importance of having early market requirements to exploring new markets even when performances were still not ideal and to integrate more than one function at low-cost levels to add value to new products.]

Actually, there were already some initiatives supported by the EC and actively pursued by the Plastic Electronics Foundation. The focus was on innovative companies establishing technology platforms in clusters in various locations in Europe.⁶⁶ Whatever DuPont got out of the meeting in Greece, it had the effect of a seed crystal in an oversaturated solution (of promises about OLAE and industry and government actors being interested but uncertain what to do). Collaborations in the value chain became visible. Specialty chemical companies started to forge alliances with small start-ups further down the value chain to develop niche applications.⁶⁷ Concurrently, several initiatives in existing technology platforms to make integrated systems were boosted as more companies realized that reaching marketable products hinged on the development of integrated systems and manufacturing processes that enabled such integration.⁶⁸

What was happening is a broadening of the idea of open innovation, […] to value chain interactions and clusters. Integration of different functionalities through roll-to-roll manufacturing was attempted in several regions in Europe, with support from the EU […] and specialization occurred, as in a cluster in Scandinavia that focused on applications of RFIDs, sensors, and integrated e-labels for the packaging industry.⁶⁹

By 2013, large printing companies were entering the field and started to forge alliances with material suppliers. This might lead to specialized design houses which further opened up the electronics value chain.⁷⁰ By 2014, the development of vertical integration of companies along the value chain was paying off, as companies were sharing responsibility in technology development. […]

At the same time, actual market introduction encountered complexities. Shared responsibilities across the value chain had been productive to develop products. [But then, flexible photovoltaics that were offered to the market were rejected by a customer, which caused a legal conflict between the start-up firm and the materials company.] This attracted attention widely. Chemical suppliers, who had wanted to seize the chance of realizing the promise of their technology option quickly, now realized that, in their collaboration with SMEs, all sorts of customized requirements had to be met […].⁷¹

The EC saw this as an opportunity to show that it could provide support where various companies had failed to collaborate sufficiently. [User laboratories were set up as an additional infrastructure where users and producers could interact more intensively.] In general, the need to find large markets is important to polymer electronics. The business strategies of various companies are geared to that.⁷² When they move in that direction, the companies are confronted with the realities of the user world.⁷³ In hindsight, it was indicative how the collaboration of the Austrian start-up Nanoident, which specialized in integrating multilayers of sensors using cheap inkjet printing, with Google Health was widely applauded, while after the actual implementation, difficulties emerged. [Health care communities had reacted negatively to the system arguing that professional quality control was absent.]

The use of sensors is not limited to medical sectors; there is also the big market of environmental monitoring which is served sometimes by the same companies. Actors in the environmental monitoring sector were afraid that the concerns about reliability of sensors would spill over into their sector. FTS, the world leader in environmental monitoring solutions, took the initiative to set up a sector-internal quality assurance program, to which other companies could subscribe.⁷⁴

The events in the medical sector and in the environmental monitoring sector were followed attentively by actors in other OLAE sectors. The issues of quality control and quality assurance were now high on the agenda generally.