Table 1 Key factors
Title | Description | Projections | Scenario 1: Policing 2.0 | Scenario 2: Turning Back the Clock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Abbreviated title for the factor Active sum Passive sum Mean=63.7 | Explanation of the factors | Possible developments for key factors | Relevance of the projection in the scenario (only percentages above the 25% threshold are listed, as recommended by the SCMI manual) | Relevance of projection in scenario (only percentages above the 25% threshold are listed, as recommended by the SCMI manual) |
Driving factors | ||||
Velocity of Innovation Active sum: 76.0 Passive sum: 59.3 | The velocity of innovation describes the ability of a society (including the government) to develop, modify, and integrate new security technologies. Various catalysts – such as openness to innovation and funding support – encourage the development and adoption of new technologies, and, more generally, the use of technologies to address security problems. | High velocity of innovation, low level of regulation, high diffusion of technology solutions, risks due to rapid and unproven use | – | 100 |
Low velocity of innovation due to regulation, skepticism on the part of consumers, but also prudence and rigor when developing technologies | 100 | – | ||
Use of Technology by Emergency and Disaster Relief Services Active sum: 73.6 Passive sum: 63.3 | Emergency and Disaster Relief Services rely on new technologies. For example, drones are generating situation pictures; exoskeletons are worn by firefighters; VR technology is used for training purposes; and AI and drones are used to evacuate large public gatherings in emergencies. | Large-scale deployment of new security technologies | 67.6 | - |
Rejection of new security technologies | 50 | |||
Combination of new and conventional security technologies | 32.4 | - | ||
Unsuccessful adoption of new security technologies by Emergency and Disaster Relief Services | - | 50 | ||
Societal Trust in Security Technologies Active sum: 64.3 Passive sum: 62.0 | The factor describes the relationship between social trust in security technologies and their use. Transparency regarding the motivations for deploying security technologies, including possible implications, increases social trust. On the basis of such transparency, individuals can develop a perspective on how a given technology works and its suitability for meeting defined aims, and can thus decide whether they favor or oppose adoption. | Use of technology despite lack of social trust | 18.9 | – |
Limited use of technology due to societal misgivings | – | 100 | ||
No societal misgivings related to use of technology | 81.1 | – | ||
Driven factors | ||||
Perception of Security Active sum: 59.3 Passive sum: 67.7 | The population’s perception of security is subjective and is determined by individually selected and weighted criteria. It has a cognitive dimension (perceived likelihood of danger and threat) and an affective dimension (fear, worry). There is often a pronounced discrepancy between subjective perceptions and objective threats to public security. | People perceive security appropriately (correspondence between subjective perception and statistical security situation). | 9.5 | 27.3 |
People feel more insecure than is statistically appropriate. | 78.4 | – | ||
People feel overly secure and do not perceive statistically significant risks. | 12.2 | 72.7 | ||
Social Scoring Systems Active sum: 56.3 Passive sum: 70.7 | Social scoring is becoming increasingly common around the world. Data on individual behavior are increasingly evaluated numerically, as such assessments are supposedly objective. While the composition of a social score is generally not transparent, its impacts for an individual or firm can be significant. In some countries, access to services and goods depends on one’s social score. | Social scoring systems (many of them intransparent) are used by various actors | 20.6 | – |
Social scoring is only allowed if it is transparent; individuals recover their control over personal data. | – | 100 | ||
Scoring is massively restricted and must be completely transparent. People can independently check what data has been collected and processed | 79.4 | - | ||
Data Sharing Active sum: 52.7 Passive sum: 73.3 | The exchange and sharing of data may be voluntary or forced, legal or illegal, and may take place between individuals, governments, and firms. This key factor highlights the importance of the data that are generated and exchanged by security technologies. | States collect and share the personal data of citizens on a legal basis | 64.7 | - |
Individuals voluntarily share data in exchange for goods and services | 35.5 | 50 | ||
- Data are collected and shared without legal basis | - | - | ||
Data are shared voluntary, but then used illegally | – | 50 | ||
Dynamic factors | ||||
Government Monitoring of Citizens Active sum: 94.3 Passive sum: 69.3 | This factor describes government surveillance as a possible driver of the technization of security. The increasing prevalence of surveillance and detection systems, combined with improved data storage and analysis capabilities, enable the comprehensive surveillance of the population, in both the public and private domains. The expansion is accompanied by a growing political dialog regarding the compatibility of surveillance with democratic values. | Digital forms of surveillance are on the rise because they are more efficient than conventional techniques | 100 | – |
Digital forms of surveillance decline, as they are vulnerable to cyberattacks | – | – | ||
Surveillance as a whole becomes less prevalent due to social opposition | – | 100 | ||
Legal Regulation of Security Technologies Active sum: 92 Passive sum: 75.7 | Standards, laws, and regulations set forth legal arrangements for the use of technologies. | The use and deployment of security technologies is regulated internationally | 14.7 | 66.7 |
The use and deployment of security technologies is regulated nationally | 85.3 | 33.3 | ||
There is little or no regulation of the use and deployment of security technologies | – | – | ||
Policing 2.0 Active sum: 90.7 Passive sum: 75.7 | Technological innovations lead to new forms of police work. For example, the police use genetic databases to convict criminals; predictive policing is used by many police departments; criminals can now be taken into preventive custody; body cams are a standard piece of equipment; government malware is used to track down criminals and terrorists; and AI predicts convict recidivism rates. These new technologies are linked to new powers, rights and duties for police officers. | Broadened use of technology, leading to automation instead of assistance | 67.6 | – |
Fewer digital security technologies; curtailment of police powers | – | 100 | ||
Expansion of police powers and broader use of new security technologies | 32.4 | – | ||
Political Valuation of Security Active sum: 69.7 Passive sum: 67.0 | Determining the proper balance between freedom and security is one aim of political discourse. In this discourse, emphasis is placed on the extent to which the granting of freedoms is possible and/or desirable in the context of ensuring security, and vice versa. | Policymakers prioritize security over freedom, driving the expansion of security technologies | 73.5 | – |
Policymakers prioritize freedom over security, curtailing the expansion of security technologies | – | 100 | ||
The government can provide security by expanding the use security technologies. However, these are regulated to ensure they do not restrict the freedoms of the citizenry | 26.5 | - | ||
Inert factors (no projections are made) | ||||
Vulnerability through Networks Active sum: 46.0 Passive sum: 63.0 | The networking of IT systems and physical objects engender new vulnerabilities, not only for security systems themselves, but also for their users. | - | - | - |
Resilience Active sum: 4.0 Passive sum: 50.3 | Resilience describes the ability of systems to withstand, prepare for, recover from and adapt to events or processes with negative consequences, whether human, technological, or environmental in nature. | - | - | - |
Involvement of Citizens in Public Security Active sum: 52.7 Passive sum: 52.0 | The digital transformation offers new opportunities for public authorities to inform or involve the citizenry in their work. The question remains to what extent the public should be involved in planning for emergency situations, in order to ensure preparedness. | - | - | - |
Leading Role in Technological Developments Active sum: 52.0 Passive sum: 62.3 | This key factor focuses on firms and public authorities that (1) produce, support, or develop security technologies, or (2) significantly influence technological developments with their funding, ideas, or decisions. These actors thus have a directive role with regard to security technologies, and can thus enforce their values, standards, and guidelines. | - | - | - |
Trustworthiness of Media Active sum: 32.3 Passive sum: 32.3 | The fracturing of the media landscape creates a situation in which people believe less and less what they read or hear in the mainstream media. In addition, “filter bubbles” reinforce individuals’ existing opinions and perspectives. | - | - | - |